The US-China frontier AI gap will still measure between 4 and 14 months next time — resolves 2026-10-31

The debate: whether US export controls on chips to China have actually widened the gap in AI capability between the two countries, with each side insisting it is right.

Why it matters: whether the gap is months or years directly decides whether Chinese models belong on the list of supply-chain options.

Who is on each side: the controls-have-failed camp says the gap has nearly closed and the controls-work camp says it is widening; we bet on neither happening and the gap staying in its current range.

Epoch AI's next published measurement of the US-China frontier capability gap lands between 4 and 14 months, neither narrowing inside 4 months nor widening past 14.

SemiAnalysis
“DeepSeek v4... co-designed in part for Huawei…”

SemiAnalysis
“CXMT... likely to become the largest semiconductor…”

SemiAnalysis
“The Big-3 hold over 85% combined market share…”

CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies)
“the controls have clearly accelerated Beijing's…”

Bloomberg
“China is preparing to spend around 2 trillion yuan…”

Compare Epoch AI's next updated reading against both bounds: inside the 4-14 month range is a hit; outside either bound is a miss; if Epoch publishes no new reading by the due date, the call is unresolvable.

Can't be determined (settled 2026-10-31)

Closed 2026-10-31 as unresolvable: the page Epoch AI designated as the yardstick is still the January 2026 version (minimum gap four months, maximum fourteen), and no newer US-China gap update appeared in the window. Month figures from a researcher interview and a third-party calculation are not the named source, so they were not used.